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Sherwood: Walter White and the British: A Lost Oppurtunity

Marika Sherwood
WALTER WHITE AND THE BRITISH:
A LOST OPPORTUNITY
N ms ARTICLE, WalterWhiteandthe AmericanNegroSoldierin World

War II, Thomas
Hachey 1 concluded that there was "no real way to determine the measure of
influence, if any, that Walter White had upon the plight of colored peoples in other
lands during the Second World War." While I would agree with this statement, black
American soldiers were not the only "colored people" involved in WWII: as White
himself wrote, "WWII has given theNegro a sense ofkinship with other colored peoples
of the world; he senses that the struggle of the Negro in the U.S. is part and parcel of the
struggle against imperialism and exploitation in India, China, Burma, Africa, the
Philippines Malaya, the West Indies and South America.Y Yet, when we examine
White's correspondence with the British government regarding British racism and his
visit to the U.K. in 1944, his sense of kinship with the plight of other blacks appears to
be as nonexistent as was his inability or unwillingness to use the power and influence of
the NAACP on their behalf. These episodes also demonstrate the duplicity, mendacity,
and racism of the British as well as the ease with which they handled the NAACP's
Secretary, who turned out to be a paper tiger, despite British apprehensions.

I

EPISODE 1: BRITISH RECRUITMENT IN THE U.S.A.
In 1940 the British government began to appeal for aid and volunteers to help the
British war effort One ofthe ftrst pleas was for 1000 medical offtcers and for blood. The
military attache in Washington immediately sought clariftcation from the War Office
(WO) in London regarding the acceptability of "Negro" doctors. The British and U.S.
Red Cross had advised against blacks, but, the Attache warned, we cannot say this
publicly, so we shall have to say they are acceptable, "even though eventually we take
none." That this ploy was acceptable to the WO is signifted by the comment on the file
"need take no action.'?
In June 1940 the Marquess of Lothian, British Ambassador in Washington, was
informed of the immediate requirements of the British armed forces: the Royal Air Force
(RAP) needed pilots, wireless operators and skilled tradesmen. Nine months later the
requirements werequantifted: skilled tradesmen were in urgent need, 3,850 for the army,
12,650 for the RAF, and 4,620 for the Royal Navy (RN). Evidently in reply to a query
from the Embassy, the Foreign Office (FO) clarified that the RN only accepted Britishborn sons of British born parents (i.e., those ofEuropean descent) while the RAF and the
army made no such racial stipulations.'
This apparent absence of what the British called the "colour bar" did not, however,
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mean that the RAP and the army were prepared to accept men not of pure European
descent, at least at this stage of the war. There had been a color bar in all the armed
services, but at the instigation of the Colonial Office (CO), which had the task ofkeeping
Britain's "colored" colonial subjects loyal during the hostilities, the military chiefs
agreed to accept those of not "pure European descent." A grand announcement to this
effect was made in both houses of Parliament on October 19,1939. The announcement
was pure propaganda: the FO advised its consular officers, and the CO its colonial
governors that only "white volunteers should be accepted." No explicit instructions on
how to deal with this contradiction were given; "how to handle this we leave to your
discretion," the FO advised its officers abroad.> Unaware ofBritish hypocrisy and racism,
U.S. blacks responded to Britain's call for help. When they found their services refused,
they protested-some directly to the British and others to the the NAACP.

CASES OF DISCRIMINAnON
Dr. Walter King of New York volunteered his services to the U.S. Red Cross and
was refused. When he pressed for an explanation, he was told that "it is true that only
white citizens are eligible for the Doctors for Britain Project ... The American Red
Cross is acting upon instructions and cannot deviate from them." Dr. King contacted
Judge Hastie who advised him to go to the NAACP. The Red Cross also refused to accept
"Negro blood" for British victims of Nazi bombs, again claiming that they were "acting
on instructions."6
Charles M. Ashe, a pilot with 2,400 flying hours experience, applied to join the
Royal Air Ferry Command, which delivered airplanes from Canada to the U.K. When
he was turned down, Ashe asked Claude Barnett of the Associated Negro Press for
advice; Barnett suggested that he should demand an explanation from the British Air
Ministry. He did and in response received from J. D. Mugford, Captain of the Ferry
Command, a copy of the RAF's specifications, which clearly stated that "all applicants
must be of the white race."
Moreover, theNAACP had learned that all blacks who had applied for employment
at the U.K. Purchasing Commission in Washington had been turned down, even for
menial jobs. Col. J. D. Arthur of the U.S. Corps ofEngineers informed his superiors that
he had been "informally advised that the British government probably would not visa a
passport issued to an American Negro. No actual refusal has so far occurred because no
Negroes have been selected." Edward Lawson, an official of the U.S. War Office
Production Board, who had discussed with British officials the issue of sending black
Americans to work on the bases, had been told that there were no objections. Yet when
he questioned the construction contractors working on the islands he discovered that
there was a clause in the contracts which they interpreted as meaning "that they should
not bring Negro workers from the States at the 'white man's rate of pay'. which is
considerably higher than the native rate of pay. " Despite this. on checking it was found
that ten blacks had in fact been sent, but only to Bermuda, and that "none of these was
of West Indian descent."?
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THE NAACP'S LETTER OF PROTEST
Unfortunately I have been unable to discoverany materiels relating to the investigation
of these complaints by the NAACP. Whatever the process (if any), the NAACP sent a
detailed letter to Prime Minister Winston Churchill with copies to President Roosevelt,
the U.S. Red Cross, the Fight for Freedom Committee, the British War Relief Society,
and the British Military Attache, The letter, dated September 26,1941, points out that
theNegro's "numerical position is ofsufficient importance to have a material effect upon
the defense efforts of the United States." After outlining the complaints, White accused
the British of being "no less guilty of racial arrogance than is Nazi Germany unless the
leaders of the British Government summarily orderthe abolition of such discrimination
... [T]he same freedom from prejudice must be manifested at the Peace Conference."8
White indicated that he intended making his letter public. Colonel Benson, the Military
Attache, summoned all his powers of persuasion to achieve White's agreement not to
publish until Churchill had received the letter. White agreed to delay till October 15.
THE PHELPS STOKES FUND JOINS THE FRAY
It appears that Walter White sent Anson Phelps Stokes a copy of his letter to
Churchill, and received an admonishment in reply. Not satisfied with this, Phelps Stokes
wrote to the new Ambassador, Lord Halifax, enclosing a copy of his letter to White, and
regretting the sending of the "in some ways unfortunate letter to the Prime Minister."
White, he reassured the Ambassador, "is disposed to listen to reason when all the facts
are presented to him." Reminding Halifax that they had met at a dinner party recently,
Phelps Stokes respectfully suggested that the Embassy might consider having "some
qualified person to whom it could turn for information or advice in dealing with the
Negro American." Halifax replied on October 29 that he was waiting for a reply from
London and would share whatever response he was authorized to make. He was sure
"that your letter (to the NAACP) will have done much good." Regarding the suggestion
for an adviser on Negro affairs, the Embassy staff was already too large, but he would
"not fail to take advantage of your kind suggestion that we might consult your
Foundation in regard to questions of this nature."
Although White's letters to Phelps Stokes have not been preserved we do have a
second letter from Phelps Stokes, dated November 3, accusing White of exaggeration in
comparing the position of U.S. Negroes to Jews under the Nazis. Though agreeing that
the alleged discriminations all "deserved serious consideration," Phelps Stokes defended
British rule in the colonies as "determined to help the Negroes of Africa as soon as
possible to acquire the capacity and right of self-government. ''9
Anson Phelps Stokes had met many religious, missionary and political groups
during his visits to the U.K. in the 19208 and '30s. He and the Foundation's secretary,
Thomas Jesse Jones, maintained a correspondence with British organizations such as the
Anti-Slavery Society, the Royal African Society and the League ofColoured People, and
with such luminaries as Lord and Lady Simon (he, the Lord Chancellor, she, a leading
philanthropist) and Arthur Creech Jones, who became Colonial Secretary in the post-war
Labour government Thus itis not surprising to find that in a letter to Dr. Oldham of the
Christian Newsletterui Oxford, Phelps Stokes urges that the "British government should
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go as far as it can to assure the darker people of the world who are part of the
Empire ... that [it] is definitely committed to the principle of helping backward people
to attain as rapidly as possible the position where they will be fitted to have the major
say in determining their own destiny." Clearly Phelps Stokes was no respecter of
confidentiality: he enclosed copies of his letters to White, the Ambassador and the
NAACP's October press release.t?

CONSTERNATION IN THE BRITISH CAMP
The NAACP's letter led to a flurry of activity. Downing St. sent the letter to the FO,
together with another letter of protest from a Mrs. Louis Jones of New York. (Other
protests had been sent directly to the U.S. State Department and the FO.) Following the
Prime Minister's request to deal with the matter, the FO immediately sent copies to the
Colonial Office and the ministries of Air and Health; it requested the Prime Minister to
acknowledge receipt, and sent information (not preserved in the files) to the Embassy in
Washington to help with responding to any queries subsequent to the NAACP's press
release. (There were further queries when Representative Arthur Mitchell read into the
Congressional Record the Philadelphia Civic League's protest regarding a statement by
the U.S. Civil Service that the government of Trinidad had refused to accept U.S.
Negroes would not be accepted on that British island.jt!
Lord Halifax sent further details and suggestions: Charles Ashe had been told he
didn't have the right kind of experience; though a Negro doctor would not be suitable
for service in London might it be advisable to accept one or two for service elsewhere?
The publicity being considered by the NAACP probably would not lead to an adverse
reaction in the U.S., but "our coloured colonial problems should be borne in mind." The
Embassy also wrote, denying discrimination among blood donors and stating that the
U.S. was responsible for the selection ofworkers for the bases in the Caribbean. Another
Negro doctor had applied for the Royal Army Medical Corps, but, thank goodness, could
be refused as being over the age limit. 12
Letters flew back and forth between the ministries and the Embassy in the attempt
to draft an acceptable reply to the NAACP:

1. The Ministry of Health categorically denied any discrimination in the blood
used by its transfusion services. On the question ofNegro doctors, the Ministry
was evasive: "patients have no choice ofhospitals or staff. .. We must take into
account the susceptibilities of the patients and provide a service similar to that
which they would normally be accustomed." This reply caused some concern
among FO officials: "we shall have to skate over the question of coloured
doctors when replying to the NAACP," one noted, while another felt this would
be the most difficult point to answer. Both the Ministry of Health and the CO
knew and pointed out to the FO that there were numbers of Negro doctors in
the U .K)3 However, the CO officials acquiesced to a new, emotive, paternalist
andracist clause in the draft reply: "a coloured doctor might make children feel
uneasy as they do not know the traditional kindness shown by coloured people
to children."14
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol9/iss1/16
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2. It was found that the Ferry Command requirements did prescribe that recruits
should be "of the white race," but Ashe had not been "turned down solely on
account of his racial extraction." The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the
color bar was a "dangerous source of irritation"; surely as its removal was
hardly likely to lead to an "embarrassing number of applicants from Negroes
for employment at the Ferry Service," the Air Council could consider deleting
the racial prescription? The Council graciously complied. IS The Colonial
Office felt that to refuse American Negroes was "contrary to the spirit" of the
agreement by British armed forces and civil defence to accepts Blacks.
However, as the Negro in question was not a British subject, the problem was
not theirs.
3. The Embassy investigated the employment of Negroes at its premises and
reported on February 17, 1942 that it did not discriminate on the basis of race,
creed or color, and employed 66 "coloured" men and 44 "coloured" women.
Five days lateranothertelegram arrived in London: the Embassy had miscounted:
"previous telegram incorrect . . . employ 5 coloured messengers and 10
coloured char women."16
The British Purchasing Commission issued a press releaseon October3 stating
that no British mission discriminated on religious grounds; but, as the work
involved "confidential war information ... special precautions in selecting
employees" had to be exercised. This applied "with equal force to applicants
who are coloured; no discrimination has been, or will be exercised on account
of colour."17 However, the Commission's letter to the War Office which was
duly forwarded to the FO, told a different story. "We don't discriminate on
religious grounds," they wrote; as the work is confidential, "we usually prefer
Americans with American-born parents." This direct emulation of the standard
British formula (British-born sons of British-born parents) for excluding
Blacks, would hardly have achieved the same result in the U.S.A. However, it
was not remarked upon by FO officials, whose only comment was that it would
be best not to specify to the NAACP what jobs Negroes held in British
employment in Washington as such revelation "would further inflame the
sensitive race consciousness of the NAACP." That most agreed on the
exclusion ofNegroes is demonstrated by the slightly more enlightened remark
by J. V. Perowne in the FO files: there is "no justification," he wrote, "for the
assumption that coloured people per se are open to question and white people
are per se reliable from the security standpoint"18
4. The Colonial Office assured the FO that the West Indian immigration laws
were free of colour discrimination; however, the administration of these laws
was left to the governors, who were not obliged to give reasons for refusals.
There were colour bar laws in some islands, the CO admitted: for example, in
some schools and hotels in Bermuda and the Bahamas. Ask the NAACP for
proof of their allegations, the CO advised. One FO official noted that this last
remark was a "good idea," while another warned "they might find one!" The
CO appears not to have passed on to the FO the information received from
Bermuda which admitted that U.S. Negro workers were excluded."?
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Numerous drafts of the reply to the NAACP were hurriedly passed around the
ministries."Not veryeasy to get the answer to complaint number twojust right," theCO
wailed on March 25. "I'm afraid this point will be the most difficult to meet," minuted
Mr. Evans of the FO.20
The NAACP had agreed to delay publishing its charges against the British until
October IS. No.IO Downing Street sent a reply on that day: "your letter is receiving
immediate attention," the Prime Minister's Secretary wrote. A month later, after the
news release, the NAACP telegrammed Churchill asking for a reply; the Ambassador
responded reassuringly that "your letter is still receiving careful consideration." In
February of the following year, Halifax was promising a reply "shortly"; by March 24,
1942 he had to admit that the reply had been delayed.s!
It tooksix months for the ministriestoagreea responseto the NAACP's protest.The
delay was due to the investigations into their allegations, wrote Anthony Bevir,
Churchill's secretary, on March 27,1942 to the NAACP. It had been found that Mr.
Ashe's technical qualifications had been insufficient;however, the racial qualification,
which hadexisted, has been withdrawn.Britishchildren might be uneasy with coloured
doctors, "and emergenciesare no time for such complications; there was no implication
of professional incompetence; all blood and blood plasma was accepted by Britain if
donors were free from communicable diseases." As the U.S. government had already
denied receivingany requests fromthe Britishgovernmentnot to send"Negroes" toU.S.
bases on the islands,all that remained to be dealt with was "American Negroes" wishing
to enter the islandsas immigrants;immigrationlaws werefreeof racialprejudiceand Mr.
Churchill knew of no "instances in which a visa has been refused to a coloured alien on
the ground of hiscolour.The BritishPurchasingCommissionhasinformedus thatit does
not discriminate on the basis of race, creed or color; that it employs66 coloured men and
44 coloured women.''22
On April23rd the PurchasingCommission in a telegram to the NAACP sent details
of the Negroes in their employ: they were electricians, porters,charwomen, firemenand
elevator operators. (Why did the Commission send this information? Had it not been
apprised of the Fa's view that it would "inflame" the NAACP?)
Neither the NAACP's nor the British archives contain any further correspondence.
Did Walter White accept the Prime Minister's specious letter? Was it beyond White to
be suspicious of the British, the overlords of an empire of some 62 million "coloured"
people? An examination of his relationship with the British Ambassador has some
bearing on this issue.
WALTER WHITE AND LORD HALIFAX

White reported to the NAACP that he had had an interview with the Ambassador
on April24th-a week or so after Churchill's letter would have been delivered. He was
careful to note that the interview lasted fifty minutes, "despite reminders from time to
time by Lord Halifax's Secretary of appointments"; and that the interview opened with
Halifax saying he had been wantingto meetWhite for some timeand had thereforeasked
Mr. Willkie to arrange this meeting. The Ambassador questioned White about the
reported low moraleamongNegroesandaskedfor detailsof discriminationin education,
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol9/iss1/16
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segregation in the armed forces, etc. He recounted to White the astonishment of visiting
Americans when he had conducted Indian women to formal dinner occasions while he
was Viceroy ofIndia. White responded by suggesting a U.S. Commission, consisting of
Wendell Willkie, Justice Frankfurter, and a "distinguished American Negro" to visit
India and assure Indians that the U.S. "would stand as guarantee that the pledges of
independence made to India by Great Britain would be lived up to not only after but
during the war." Lord Halifax recommended that White make this proposal to President
Roosevelt. White emphasized that "the presence of a distinguished Negro on the
commission would do more good than many words, even though the race problem itself
might not be mentioned at all." The meeting concluded with Halifax asking White to
send him "factual material and to come to see him at the Embassy in Washington.''23
This conversation is remarkable for the omission of any reference to the
correspondence with Churchill; of how flattered White obviously was at the length of
the interview; for his naivete regarding foreign affairs; for his ignorance of India, the
caste system, racial attitudes and the protocols of vice-royalty, and for confounding
independence with "the race problem." Halifax, a veteran of the appeasement of Hitler
as well as an ex-ruler of India, clearly out-maneuvered White who was obviously
susceptible to flattery by members of the British upper class.

EPISODE 2: WHITE'S FORAY TO THE U.K., 1944
As far as the archives reveal, White did not see Lord Halifax again until November
15,1943, when they met to discuss White's impending trip abroad. After ascertaining
that White was not going as an official representative of the War Department, all Halifax
promised to do to aid White was to send a telegram to inform the Foreign Secretary in
London of White's imminent arrival in the U.K. White was advised to tum to U.S.
Ambassador John Winant and the British Ministry of Information once he arrived in
London. There he would obtain aid in setting up appointments with the people that White
wished to meet, including the Prime Minister as well as King George VI. As for going
to India and visiting the jailed nationalist leaders, that decision would be made by the
government of India 24
White was planning to go to the European Theater of Operations to "adjust
difficulties between black and white troops, to bolster black troops' morale," to write
articles on these for Life, Time, and the New York Post, as well as "to write a short,
objective factual picture ofthe global problem ofrelations between white and non-white
peoples," as he informed Eleanor Roosevelt. Four weeks later White had to tell Mrs.
Roosevelt that the War Department had written that "unfavourable replies from the
Theater Commanders prevent your accreditation as a war correspondent. "25 With Mrs.
Roosevelt's help, White was eventually allowed to proceed to Britain.

BLACK TROOPS IN BRITAIN
White arrived, unannounced (or so the FO complained), on January 3, 1944. In fact,
the Embassy had not only notified the FO on 11/21/1943, but had warned that "White
was critical of our policy ... worth while to take some trouble with him.''26 His arrival
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at the Ministry of Information, which looked after journalists,led to as much of a flurry
as had the NAACP's letter two years previously. The presence of black troops in the U.K.
and pressure from the U.S. Southern Base Command for the British to acquiesce to the
U.So's traditional segregation had led to the British army drafting instructions to this
effect. Women in the Auxiliary Territorial Service had already been warned off
associating with blacks. The government was so concerned about the potential volatility
ofthe situation that in August 1942 it pressed President Roosevelt to reduce the proposed
allocation of 10% African-American troops. The FO was also uneasy about the presence
of these troops; there was reportedly "serious alarm at the promiscuity between U.S.
troops and British girls." However, by 1943 the FO accepted that "there may bea military
reason for the presence of coloured troops in this country, but one important American
motive for sending them was certainly political. Weneed not begrudge the Administration
much needed Negro voteS.''27

CONSTERNATION (AGAIN) IN THE BRITISH CAMP
The consternation caused by White's arrival has been documented by Thomas
Hachey, as already mentioned. What shall we do?, the FO cabled Halifax in Washington.
Refuse him a visa to India, the Ambassador replied; or tell him we're prepared to let him
go wherever the U.S. War Department accredits him as a correspondent. The Ministry
of Information felt it had "the key to solving the White problem.... he is an imaginative
and impressionable character and if our people can show him stirring and remarkable
things when he goes about ..." It was discovered that the Time bureau chief had not been
notified ofWhite either, and thought his visit"a mistake"; Life cabled that White was not
their representative, but they would consider anything he wrote; in fact, White was only
accredited to theNew YorkPost, and only for the European Theater of Operations.P The
British ministries decided that it was up to the U.S. Ambassador to arrange the interviews
White requested. The Ambassador did not make the requests; the FO sighed with relief
and happily notified the Embassy in Washington that White was disgruntled with the
Ambassador, not with the British! White toured Britain, Europe and North Africa. In
Britain, the highest ranking official he met was the Parliamentary Under Secretary of
State for India, Lord Munster, who was adamant that White, should he be allowed U.S.
War Department accreditation to go to India, would not be permitted to see the
imprisoned nationalists. The FO suggested to the Indian government that should the U.S.
accredit him, White should be treated as an important visitor. 29
WHITE IN BRITAIN
In his autobiography White noted that he had been besieged by reporters on his
arrival and that he was closely watched wherever he went The U.S. military gave him
a guide, a staff car and a chauffeur. Regarding the British, he only notes that he had
succeeded in placing the Confidential Notes (to British officers to advise their troops not
to associate with Negroes) before the Joint Anglo-American Military/Civilian Board,
chaired by Ambassador Winant. He also reported that the British Home Office had
issued a circular to Chief Constables reminding them that British policy was not to
segregate and ordering the police not to enforce any segregation rulings made by U.S.
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authorities. He also found that some British resented American attempts to dictate with
whom they should have social relations. Other than noting in A Rising Wind that there
were Blacks in the British seaports and large cities and also West Indian and African
students and "distinguished Negro artists" living in the U.K., White made no mention
of Britain's Black population.P
Why was White so silent about his unofficial contacts in Britain? We know from his
U.K. notebooks that he met at least some of the activists and revolutionaries. His notes
mention George Padmore and Nancy Cunard and the West African Students' Union,
which he visited. Among those present at this meeting were George Padmore and H.O.
Davies, one of the founder members of the Lagos Youth Movement, a nationalist
organization. It appears that White did not visit the League of Coloured People, who
mentioned his arrival in their monthly Newsletterand that they were "hoping to see him,"
but did not allude to him again. (In November, 1941 the Newsletter had printed excerpts
from the NAACP news release. Unfortunately no League archives have been preserved
and there is nothing in the NAACP's file on the League regarding either the Churchill
correspondence or White's visit This is a most curious as the League was a highly
respectable campaigning organization, very similar to the NAACP.) White wrote to
Padmore from New York on April 26 to thank him for making "my stay so pleasant and
interesting"; from which I deduce that Padmore had introduced him at least to some of
the anti-imperialist intelligentsia in London.'!
THE SITVAnON OF BLACKS IN BRITAIN
Having met at least Cunard and Padmore as well as the members and guests of the
West African Students Union, it is impossible for White not to have been made aware
of the struggles in Britain on behalf of Blackaresident in Britain, Blacks temporarily in
the U.K. such as the West Indian workers and Negro troops, and colonial issues.
The issues regarding Black peoples in Britain included instances of discrimination
in housing and employment, in Civil Defence, in air-raid shelters, in dance halls,
restaurants and hotels; againstracistfiIms and the continuing colour bar in some sections
of the armed forces.
Issues regarding the colonies were multitudinous: sedition ordinances, suppression
of the press, the imprisonment of nationalist and labour leaders, the flogging of African
troops, compulsory labour service, land alienation, the price paid for colonial agricultural
produce, cocoa marketing, export/import quotas, improving the health, social and
educational service, discrimination in employment and discriminatory wages paid to
"natives" in the colonial civil service and armed forces; and of course, self-government
or outright independence.
The West Indian workers imported to aid the war effort were supported in their
struggle for better (and equal) labour conditions, housing and promotion prospects; the
trade unions were challenged for excluding the West Indians. They, and black troops,
were offered entertainment by both the Students Union and the League of Coloured
People. Both organizations arranged for questions to be asked in Parliament on incidents
ofdiscrimination against West Indian workers and black troops. When the League heard
of the army's confidential advice to officers to follow the U.S. tradition of segregation,
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Dr. Harold Moody, the president, questioned the governmentand discussed the issue
with the Colonial Office, the Conferenceof British Missionary Societies and Colonel
Blakely, one of the U.S. army's senior chaplains. Moody also investigatedallegations
of segregationat the AmericanRed Cross in London(hefound none,thoughI haveseen
complaintsof it elsewhere). VariousBlack British organizations combined to mounta
major protest against the imposition of the death sentence, based on very flimsy
evidence, on a black GI accused of raping a white woman; they won his reprieve.V
WALTER WHITE'S LOST OPPORTUNITY
White must havebeen informedof at leastsomeof the issues listedabove.Why did
he say nothing,do nothing?If he really had been besiegedby reporterson his arrivalin
London, he could have called a press conference,perhaps together with the League or
the Students Union. Was he so mindful of diplomaticprotocol that he did not wish to
interfere in British affairs? He had shown no awarenessof such niceties when he made
his proposal to Lord Halifaxfor Americanguaranteesof Indianindependence! Hecould
have writtenabout British struggleswhen he returned to the U.S.A.,but as far as I have
been able to find, he did not
WasWhiteso impressedby theeffusivetreatmenthereceivedin Britainat thehands
of the Ministry of Informationand by the undoubtedly anti-segregationist attitude and
behaviourof much of the Britishpublic, that he could not countenance taking up issues
of British discriminationand colonial exploitation?
Did White even believe in Britishexploitationof the colonies?He certainlyseems
not to have considered the possible outcome on the West Indies of the introduction of
U.S.-style segregationistpractices during the building and the occupation of the U.S.
bases in theislands.Nor did he ever,as far as I havebeenable to ascertain,raisethe issue
of equal wages for islanders eventually employed on the bases. In his A Rising Wind
White appears to see the issueof coloniesonlyas a supportto the strugglein theU.S.A.:
"The Negrosoldierisconvincedthatas timeproceedsthatidentification of interestswill
spread even among some brown and yellow peoples who today refuse to see the
connection between their exploitation by white nations and discrimination against the
Negro in the U.S." (144) How could White issue this veiled call for peoples oppressed
in the colonies to support the struggleof the Negro when he did nothing to support the
cause of colonial freedom?
And, harkingback to the correspondencewith Churchill,why did the NAACP not
reply to Churchill?It could not havebeen so difficult to see throughthe evasivenessof
thereply,nor to perceivetheunderlyingracism.Norcouldithavebeendifficulttofollow
up on the reply, investigate a little further, ask questions of the many West Indian
organizationsin New York,or theLeague of ColouredPeople in London,or of someof
the contacts White had made on a previous visit to England, such as the Anti-Slavery
Society.
But, having made the gesture, White did nothing. Perhaps the "natives" in the
colonies,or theBlackworkingmanin Britaindid not merithisinterest;hehadbeen,after
all, taken in by Halifax's flattery.There is an indicationof White's class attitudesin his
report to the NAACP on his travels: in the list of his accomplishments he notes that he
had arranged for "an intelligentNegro sergeant" to be put on the staffof Stars & Stripes
andYank.33 Though heclearlyfeltpersonallyinsultedby the treatmenthereceivedat the
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol9/iss1/16
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hands of AmbassadorWinant.he appears not to havebeen aware of Britishracismor to
have paid any attention to what he learnedfrom his contacts whilein Britain.Whatever
the answer to these questions, White certainly missed the two opportunities he had to
seriously challenge British racism.
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